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RECENT DECISIONS
the cares and problems of labor, traffic and competition is not an
abuse of this police power.26
It is for the legislature to determine what occupations should
be restrained as interfering with the rest and leisure of the first day
of the week.2 7 It may direct its police power against what it deems
the evil of non-observance of Sunday laws without necessarily cover-
ing the entire field of possible abuse.28  "The lack of abstract sym-
metry does not matter." 29 The statute cannot be set aside because
it incidentally injures a particular business while it permits certain
others to remain open provided that the discrimination is consistent
with the purpose of the statute.30
"The legislature is free to make classifications in the applica-
tion of a statute which are relevant to the legislative purpose. The
ultimate test of validity is not whether the classes differ but whether
the differences between them are pertinent to the subjct with re-
spect to which the classification is made." s1 General public selling
on Sunday is a particular abuse of the customs of the community and
inherently different from laboring on Sunday or the selling of the
particular commodities permitted by Section 2147.
It is submitted that the conclusion of the court was consistent
with the legislature's intent and with prior interpretations of the
statute. While it is customary to think of the Sunday laws as ob-
solete "blue laws", a reasonable consideration of their benefits will
reveal that it is necessary for a well-ordered and refined society to
abstain from labor and business one day a week.
DomEsTIc RELATIONS-SECOND MARRIAGE INVALID WHEN
CONTRACTED BEFORE FINALITY OF INTERLOcUTORY DECREE TO
EARLIER MARRIAGE.-Plaintiff married defendant prior to the finality
of an interlocutory decree of annulment of the defendant's previous
marriage. Plaintiff sought an annulment upon these facts.' De-
fendant asked judgment for a decree of separation on the ground
that plaintiff deceived her as to the effectiveness of her interlocutory
decree and the validity of their marriage. Held, judgment for de-
2 Hennington v. Georgia, 163 U. S. 299 (1896).
27 Petit v. Minnesota, 177 U. S. 164 (1900); Neuendorff v. Duryea, 69
N. Y. 557 (1877).
28 Central Lumber Co. v. South Dakota, 226 U. S. 157 (1912).
29 Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U. S. 138, 144 (1914).3 0 Asbury Hospital v. Cass County, 326 U. S. 207 (1945) ; accord, Patsone
v. Pennsylvania. 232 U. S. 138 (1914).31Asbury Hospital v. Cass County, 326 U. S. 207, 214 (1945).
IN. Y. Civ. PRac. Act § 1134. "An action to annul a marriage upon the
ground that . . . the former marriage [was] . . . in force, may be
maintained . . . !"
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fendant reversed. Plaintiff's attempted marriage to defendant was
without validity from its inception 2 since an interlocutory decree of
annulment contemplates a final decree before it will effectively dis-
solve a marriage.3 Thus he may seek an annulment although he
does not come into court with "clean hands." Defendant is not en-
titled to a judgment of separation despite her having acted in good
faith. Landsman v. Landsman, 302 N. Y. 45, 96 N. E. 2d 81 (1950).
A marriage is absolutely void if contracted b a person whose
spouse by a former marriage is living, unless there has been an ef-
fective divorce or annulment.4 By attacking the validity of a di-
vorce decree 5 of a prior marriage of his present spouse, a party
can establish the continuing existence of a valid marital relation by
his spouse at the time of their marriage.6 The latter marriage being
of no effect the second spouse is consequently entitled to a decree
of nullity.7
In instances where equitable considerations have been applied,
however, such a decree has not been granted.8 In such cases, there-
fore the parties to both marriages are uncertain as to their status.9
This has resulted whether the question was presented affirmatively
through an annulment action 10 or by way of counterclaim, 1 or
affirmative defense.11 Generally the doctrine of "clean hands" 18 or
estoppel14 has been the basis for refusal in such cases. The public
2 N. Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 6.
3 Matter of Crandall, 196 N. Y. 127, 89 N. E. 578 (1909); Pettit v.
Pettit, 105 App. Div. 312, 93 N. Y. Supp. 1001 (3d Dep't 1905). An inter-
locutory decree contemplates a final judgment. N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 1176.
"Three months after the entry of the interlocutory judgment in an action
brought for judgment annulling a marriage ...such interlocutory judgment
shall become the final judgment ..
4 Ibid.
5 This is usually done by showing that the court granting the divorce
lacked jurisdiction of either party in that action.6 See note 3 supra.7 Brown v. Brown, 153 App. Div. 645, 138 N. Y. Supp. 602 (1st Dep't
1912) ; Heflinger v. Heflinger, 136 Va. 289, 118 S. E. 316 (1923) ; N. Y. Crv.
PRAc. AcT § 1134. Cf. Stein v. Dunne, 119 App. Div. 1, 103 N. Y. Supp. 894
(Ist Dep't 1907).8 Kaufman v. Kaufman, 177 App. Div. 162, 163 N. Y. Supp. 566 (1st
Dep't 1917); Berry v. Berry, 130 App. Div. 53, 114 N. Y. Supp. 497 (1st
Dep't 1909).9 Krause v. Krause, 282 N. Y. 355, 360, 26 N. E. 2d 290, 292 (1940).
"Nothing in this decision should be taken to mean that because the defendant
may not in these proceedings avail himself of the invalidity of his Nevada
decree he is not the husband of his first wife." Kaufman v. Kaufman, 177
App. Div. 162, 163 N. Y. Supp. 566 (1st Dep't 1917).
S0 Hubbard v. Hubbard, 228 N. Y. 81, 126 N. E. 508 (1920) ; Kaufman v.
Kaufman, 177 App. Div. 162, 163 N. Y. Supp. 566 (1st Dep't 1917).11 Villafana v. Villafana, 275 App. Div. 810, 89 N. Y. S. 2d 389 (1st Dep't
1949).
12 Margulies v. Margulies, 109 N. J. Eq. 391, 157 Atl. 676 (Ch. 1931).
Is Berry v. Berry, 130 App. Div. 53, 114 N. Y. Supp. 497 (1st Dep't 1909).
4 Margulies v. Margulies, 109 N. J. Eq. 391, 157 Atl. 676 (Ch. 1931),;
Kaufman v. Kaufman, 177 App. Div. 162, 163 N. Y. Supp. 566 (1st Dept
1917); 1 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS § 320 (5th ed 1925).
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policy and interest of the state and the fear that the "divorced wife"
may become a public charge' 5 have also influenced the decisions.
In addition the courts have held that a person may not impeach a
judgment where he was a party to the action '6 or which is not in-
jurious to his pre-existing interests 7 where he was not a party to the
action. But despite the general application of these principles of
equity and law, some courts have persisted in granting the second
spouse an annulment. They have done this even in the face of such
obviously unconscionable conduct as where the second spouse: had
knowledge of the doubtful validity of the first divorce; 's devised
the plan 19 or supplied the funds for its fraudulent procurement; 20
had been married to the "divorced wife" for fifteen years and had
a ten-year-old child.
2
'
The New Yorks courts had followed the equitable principles
herein discussed with some consistency 22 until the decisions of Fischer
v. Fischer 23 and Lefferts v. Lefferts. 24 In these two cases, the Court
of Appeals refuted all previous considerations of equity and relied
instead upon the principle that when a party seeks a divorce or sep-
aration, the primary fact to be proved is an existing marriage be-
tween the parties.25 If the defendant denies this allegation, plain-
tiff is put to her proof. 26 A failure to then establish the allegation
prevents the plaintiff from succeeding in her cause of action.27 Though
defendant does not thereby procure a dissolution of his marriage to
the plaintiff, the result to him is the same. He is thus relieved of
a spouse which he considers to be undesirable but his legal obliga-
tion for her support remains.28
The principal case seems to rectify the anomaly 29 in existence
since the Fischer case which prevented enforcement of the second
Ir5 Krause v. Krause, 282 N. Y. 355, 26 N. E. 2d 290 (1940).
16 Krause v. Krause, 282 N. Y. 355, 26 N. E. 2d 290 (1940) ; Brown v.
Brown, 242 App. Div. 33, 272 N. Y. Supp. 877 (4th Dep't 1934); Starbuck
v. Starbuck, 173 N. Y. 503, 66 N. E. 193 (1903).
17 Hall v. Hall, 139 App. Div. 120, 123 N. Y. Supp. 1056 (1st Dep't 1910);
1 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS § 319 (5th ed. 1925) ; 3 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS § 1439
(5th ed. 1925).
18 Davis v. Davis, 279 N. Y. 657, 18 N. E. 2d 306 (1938).
29 Frey v. Frey, 59 F. 2d 1046 (D. C. Cir. 1932).
20 Simmons v Simmons, 19 F. 2d 690 (D. C. Cir. 1927).
21 Kiessenbeck v. Kiessenbeck, 145 Ore. 82, 26 P. 2d 58 (1933).
22 See note 8 mtpra.
23254 N. Y. 463, 173 N. E. 680 (1930).
24 263 N. Y. 131, 188 N. E. 279 (1933).
25 Jones v. Jones, 108 N. Y. 415, 15 N. E. 707 (1888).26 Fischer v. Fischer, 254 N . Y. 463, 173 N. E. 680 (1930).
27 Ibid.
28 Johnson v. Johnson, 295 N. Y. 477, 68 N. E. 2d 499 (1946). N. Y. Civ.
PRAc. AcT § 1140-a. For an interesting discussion of this point, see Sparacio,
Alimony and the Bigamist: A Comment on Section 1140-a of the New York
Civil Practice Act, 21 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 1 (1946).
29 See Krause v. Krause, 282 N. Y. 355, 361, 26 N. E. 2d 290, 293 (1940)
(Loughran, J., dissenting).
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marriage when put in issue by the defendant, although it did not
permit its formal dissolution by annulment.30
INJUNCTION-MIGRATORY DIVORCE-RIGHT OF DOMICILIARY TO
ENJOIN PROSECUTION OF Ex PARTE FOREIGN DIVORCE ACTION.-
In an action by a wife for separation and alimony the complaint
alleged that defendant, desiring a divorce, had abandoned plaintiff.
The answer admitted the abandonment, claimed it was justified, but
consented to a separation with alimony to be fixed by the court.
After issue joined plaintiff moved to enjoin defendant from proceed-
ing with a Virgin Islands divorce action alleging that his residence
there was sham and only for the purpose of obtaining a divorce.
Held, temporary injunction during the pendency of the action granted.
When a wife sues for separation and the husband goes to another
jurisdiction and attempts to get a divorce there without appearance
by the wife there is necessity for intervention by a court of equity
for the protection of the wife. The bases for plaintiff's fears are the.
"full faith and credit" and "prima facie weight" holdings of William
v. North Carolina.' Garvin v. Garvin, 302 N. Y. 96 (1951).
The discretionary issuance by equity of injunctions is commonly
asserted to rest upon the irreparable injury which would result to
the petitioning party were the restraining order not granted.2 Irre-
parable injury is said to exist when some legal wrong has been
done or threatened and when there exists in the moving party some
substantial legal right to be protected.3
The law is well established that a court of equity has the in-
herent power to enjoin and restrain residents of its jurisdiction
from prosecuting an action commenced in a foreign jurisdiction. 4
However, in Goldstein v. Goldsteinr5 it was held by the Court of
Appeals that a permanent injunction would not issue at the instance
of the petitioning domiciliary on the grounds (1) that a foreign
divorce decree issued by a court not having jurisdiction of the matri-
monial domicile, being void, injures no one,6 and (2) that an injury
30 Villafana v. Villafana, 275 App. Div. 810, 89 N. Y. S. 2d 389 (1st Dep't
1949).
1317 U. S. 287 (1942); 325 U. S. 226 (1945).2 WALSH, A TREATISE ON Egurry § 57 (1930).
3 Baumann v. Baumann, 250 N. Y. 382, 165 N. E. 819 (1929); Gold v.
Gold, 158 Misc. 570, 287 N. Y. Supp. 217 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
4 Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U. S. 107 (1890). See Pound, The Progress
of the Law--Equity, 33 HARv: L. REv. 420, 425 (1920).
5 283 N. Y. 146, 27 N. E. 2d 969 (1940). For a criticism of the Goldstein
case, see Comment, 9 FoRD. L. REv. 376 (1940).6 "The plaintiff has nothing to fear from the action . . . against her in
Florida for . . . a judgment entered therein would be a nullity." Goldstein
v. Goldstein, mpra note 5 at 148. 27 N. E. 2d at 969.
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